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*Frege the conventionalist and Carnap the Fregean*

I begin by identifying passages in Frege's work that count against the standard interpretation of Frege as being a platonist of the most extreme sort. The goal is not to argue that Frege was not a platonist, but that there are at least some conventionalist tendencies in Frege's work. I then outline Carnap's position on matters in the foundations of logic and mathematics. I argue that the differences between the positions of these two philosophers can be traced to a disagreement about just a few theses. I point out that given technical developments between Frege and Carnap's time, Frege's position on these points becomes untenable. In this sense we can see Carnap as holding a maximally Fregean position on the nature of logical and mathematical knowledge.