

DAVID DeVIDI, Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1
Logical pluralism and the municipal by-laws of thought

Is there any sense in which it is both *interesting* and *true* that there is a plurality of logics? There are, of course, a multiplicity of systems traveling under the name 'logic': various modal, deontic, combinatorial, constructive, paraconsistent, relevant, higher order, free, and other 'logics', not to mention impoverished ancestors like Aristotelean syllogism, that differ from the standard first-order predicate logic favored by mathematicians and philosophers. But for all that, there might be a plurality of logics in only a trivial or uninteresting sense.

In this paper the prospects for logical pluralism are investigated. In particular, currently popular defenses of pluralism, such as the one due to J. C. Beall and Greg Restall, are investigated and found to yield just such an uninteresting logical plurality. An alternative version of pluralism is sketched, beginning with the observation that a variety of traditional accounts of what distinguishes logical from non-logical principles, usually regarded as equivalent, actually draw the logic–non-logic line in different places.